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IN THE s.UPREME CO·URT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. SMITH,
Plaintiff and AppelZant,
·Case
No. 9290

vs.

D. W. LOERTSCHER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF O·F RESP·ONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The statement of the case by the appellant adequately reflects the nature of the controversy. We consider it sufficient here to note that the appellant brought
this action to recover a real estate commission. The
respondent defended on the grounds that appellant did
not procure a buyer ready and willing to p·urchase the
1
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property, either on the terms set forth in the listing
agreement (Ex. 1), or on any other terms to which t;he
respondent agreed. As will be noted in the argument,
there was a direct conflict in the evidence as to whether
the prospective buyer, J. Holman Waters, and the respondent reached an agreement on the date of possession.
Mr. Waters testified that they did, (R. 173, 183). The
respondent testified that they did not, (R. 203, 208, 225).
The matter was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories, and the jury found that Mr. Waters and
respondent did not agree on the terms of a contract,
(R. 83). The only issues now raised by appellant relate
to the instructions.
By way of a cross-assignment of error, respondent
contends that the court should have granted the respondent's request for a directed verdict, (R. 56). The basis
for this contention is that the prospective purchaser
never made a written offer which either met the terms
of the listing contract or any other terms agreeable to
the respondent seller. In fact, appellant testified that
there was never a document even prepared, that either
or both parties would sign, (R. 150). Respondent confirms this, (R. 215). The listing agreement provided
for payment of a commission if the appellant real estate
agent found a purchaser ready, '"illing and able to buy
the property on the terms listed or on any other terms
to which the respondent seller "agreed", (Ex. 1). The
only written offer ever secured (dated February 20,
1959, Ex. 1) did not meet the ter1ns of the listing agreement, (R. 116) and although under the plaintiff's version
of the testimony, the p-rospective purchaser and seller
2
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did reach an oral agreement on the ter1ns of a sale,
the seller never did sign nor deliver a written offer in
accordance with the alleged oral agreement. By our
cross-assignment of error, we contend that the commission was not earned because such a written offer was
not secured, and our motion for non-suit (R. 189-190)
and our request for directed verdict sh~uld have been
granted. If we are right as to this, an error in the
instructions, if there were any error, would be immaterial.
We will first endeavor to answer the appellant's
points, and will then argue our cross-assignment of error.

STATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
'THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE SPECIAL INTER-ROGATORY SUBMITTED TO 'THE JURY.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY 'THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE.
POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THE WRITTEN OFFER OF FEBRUARY 20TH
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LISTING AGREEMENT.
POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION IF DEFENDANT CALLED
THE TRANSACTION OFF.
POINT V.
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE JURY.

3
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POINT VI.
THE UTAH CASES HOLD THAT EVEN IF AN INSTRUCTION IS EXTRANEOUS, THE VERDICT WILL NOT
BE REVERSED UNLESS IT IS PREJUDICIAL.
POINT VII.
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. IF THIS COURT
WERE 'TO HOLD 'THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ANY OF ·THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE AFFIRMED,
BE·CAUSE UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDAN'T'S R·EQUES'T FOR A
DIRECTED VERDI'CT.

ARGl.TMENT
We believe that it will assist the court in analyzing
the instructions and the points raised by appellant in
regard thereto if we briefly review the fact issues which
were presented by the evidence.
Appellant testified that he had known l\1r. J. Holman
Waters for about ten or twelve years; and in January
of 1959 Mr. Waters requested appellant to help hin1 find
a ranch, (R. 101). The appellant drove to respondent's
ranch near Park City on February 1±, 1959, and secured
a listing agreement, (R. 104, Ex. 1). l\Ir. -\Vaters examined the ranch, (R. 106, 110) and on February 20th
made a written offer, (R·. 117, Ex. 4). The offer did
not meet various terms of the listing eontract, and it
was rejected by respondent, (R. 122, 117).
The appellant, the respondent and l\Ir. \Vaters then
discussed the various points " herein they differed, (R.
168) and as a result of this conversation the respondent
and the appellant went to see respondent's la,Yyer, l\Ir.
R. J. Hogan, to draw up a new contract. Mr. Water~
testified:
7
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"I said it would be all right with me to have
his attorney draw up the contract, as long as I
could see it and look at it before it was signed
by either of us." (R. 169). See also R. 180.
Attorney Hogan, who died prior to the trial, (R.
126) prepared a draft of a contract, which was introduced in evidence as Ex. 6., (R. 133). The respondent
picked up the proposed draft from Attorney Hogan and
without examining it, (R. 201) left a copy with Mr.
Waters and took another copy home to study it. The
contract as drafted by Mr. Hogan was not acceptable
to Mr. Waters, (R. 170). It also was not acceptable to
Mr. Loertscher, the respondent, (R. 207).
Thereafter, on a date which Mr. Loertscher says
was near Easter, (R. 206) the respondent and Mr. Waters
had another lengthy conversation. Both Mr. Waters
and respondent indicated that this conversation lasted
about two and one-half hours; that they started for
~1r. Hogan's office to keep an appointment; that Mr.
Waters could see that they were not in agreement, and
suggested that they have lunch and talk the matter out,
(R. 207, 171-175). Mr. Waters specifically testified that
they had reached an oral agree·ment to the effect that
possession of the ranch would be delivered to Waters
on l\1ay 1st, but that respondent would be permitted
to live in the house while he was building his new one,
(R. 173). Mr. Waters also testified that the parti-es were
not going to put the date of possession in the contract,
(R. 183).
The respondent testified unequivocally that they
did not agree on the possession date, (R. 208, 211, 228).
5
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He also said the contract (Ex. 6) which fixed a May 1st
possession date, had to be corrected, (R. 225) but he
never told Attorney Hogan to redraft it, because they
never did agree on a possession date, (R. 228).
The primary issue of fact to be determined by
the jury was whether or not Mr. Waters, the prospective purchaser, and the respondent reached an oral
understanding concerning the terms of the sale, and in
particular as to the date of possession. The court submitted this issue to the jury as a special interrogatory,
and this brings us to appellant's first point.
POINT I.
'THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORY SUBMITTED TO THE JURY.

The proposition submitted to the jury, (R. 76, 83)
was as follows:
"Proposition No. 1: The defendant, as the
seller, and J. Holman Waters, the Buyer, reached
a complete oral or verbal understanding as to
the price and all other terms and conditions
under which the defendant 'vould sell and Mr.
Waters would buy the listed property."
The jury was instructed to answer this proposition
"True", "False", or "No preponderance of' the evidence
either way." The jury answered the proposition "False."
(R. 83).
The plaintiff here complains because the trial court
did not give his requested Instruction No. 5. The proposition, as the plaintiff would have had it worded, ,vas
as follows:
"Did the defendant, as the seller, and J.
6
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Holman Waters, as the Buyer, reach a complete
oral, or verbal understanding as to the price
and terms which should be placed in the written
contract for the sale of the real estate~"
The proposition requested by plaintiff only asked
the jury to determine whether the parties had reached
agreement as to the items which were to be placed ~n
the written contract for the sale of the property, (R. 52).
This was not the issue. The sharp conflict in the testimony of Mr. Waters and respondent was related directly
to the date of possession. As noted above, Mr. Waters
testified that the parties had agreed on a May 1st possession date, but respondent could continue to use the
house, (R. 173). More important still-as to this instruction-Mr. Waters also testified that this was not to be
placed in the written contract. He said possession was
to be given:
"No later than May 1st, to which he Respondent had agreed. That was not to be include1d in
the sales agree.m.ent. That was something we
could work out between us .... '' (R. 183)
Respondent denied that agreement was ever reached
on a possession date; (R. 208, 211, 218, 228) that the
contract (Ex. 6-) which fixed possession on May 1st had
to be corrected, (R. 216); that the re-draft of the contract was never made, because the parties could not
agree on the possession date, (R. 2'28) and that the deal
fell apart because Mr. Waters would not yield on this
point, (R. 216, 235, 218).
It thus would not have been sufficient merely to have
the jury answer the question (requested by ap·pellant)
as to whether the parties had agreed on the things to
7
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be put into the written contract. The issue was: Had
the prospective buyer and the respondent reached an
oral understanding as to all of the terms under which
one would buy and the other would sell the property~
This is exactly what the court asked the jury, and the
jury answered that the parties had not reached agreement.
The plaintiff further contends that a clarifying
instruction was, in any event, necessary. In this regard
the ap·p·ellant requested the court by his Request No. 3
to tell the jury that if the parties had agreed as to all
matters which "should go into the written contract",
then ''complete agreement" \vas reached, even though
other matters were left for future determination. This,
of course, is not the law. Admittedly, the parties could
have agreed that the written contract would cover everything but the possession date, and that they would work
out the possession date, as ~Ir. Waters testified, (R.183).
If, however, they were unable to agree on the date of
possession (as the respondent testified), (R. 218, 211,
228) there would be no agree1nent. In other words, both
in the proposition proposed by appellant (Request 5,
R. 52) and in the clarifying instruction, R.equest No. 3,
the only thing the appellant wanted the jury to determine was whether the parties had reached an agreen1ent
as to the things which were to be reduced to '\Vriting.
Neither the requested proposition nor the requested
clarifying instruction told the jury that the parties had
to reach agreement on all the terms under ".,.hich aters
would buy and plaintiff would sell the property.

'T

The court did give Instruction 9(g) '\vhich covered
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lli,

ll

if.

in general the subject matter of appellant's Request No.
3. The jury was told that the parties could reach an
agreement for the sale of the property without a determination of how the defendant's housing problem would
be solved, and that if the jury believed that the parties
had orally agreed to the terms of the sale, and both had
intended for it to be drawn up and signed, hut to leave
for future determination the solution of the housing
arrangement, they should answer the proposition,
"True". The court then went on to tell the jury that if
the parties had not orally agreed when possession would
be delivered under the proposed contract, they should
answer the proposition "False". We submit that there
is no error in this regard.
POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING 'THE
JURY THAT THE AGREEMEN'T BETWEEN THE DEFENDAN'T AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE.

The appellant contends that the trial court should
not have given Instruction 9 (f) (R. 78), which correctly
told the jury that under Utah law an agreement to buy
and sell real estate is not enforceable unless the agreement is in writing and is signed by the party to be bound.
....~ppellant

does not contend that this instruction
misstated the law. He merely claims that it was irrelevant. We submit that this instruction was entirely relevant, and indeed necessary to assist the jury in resolving
the dispute in the testimony concerning the date of possession.
Respondent, throughout his testimony, gave as his
reason for not agreeing to the May 1st possession date
9
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the fact that he did not have the ranch sold-nothing
in writing, and he could not sell his dairy until he knew
the ranch was sold. For example, at R. 210:

"Q.

And why hadn't you sold your herd in February or earlier in 1\farch ~
A. I couldn't sell, because I didn't have my farm
sold. I had no firm agreement, no signed
contract whatsoever, with Mr. Waters. Nothing had been presented to me by Mr. Smith,
that I could sell my cows knowing that I
definitely had a sale."
Then at page 208 he testified:
''I was milking a large herd of cows, and I
just couldn't-! depend entirely upon the income
from these cows for my income, and I just couldn't
go ahead and dispose of my dairy without definitely knowing I had a firm contract of sale."
He then explained the problems of selling a dairy herd
and Grade A milk base, (R. 209). Appellant's counsel,
on cross-examination of the respondent, asked at some
length about offers on the cows, (R. 233).
All of the witnesses admit that they had reached
a date near the middle of April, still without a draft of
a contract which was acceptable to either respondent or
Mr. Waters. Appellant so testified, (R. 150) and respondent (R. 215) and Mr. Waters (R. 177-8). Since
the only reason respondent had given for his objection
to the May 1st date was that he could not sell his dairy
until he knew the ranch was sold and he could not sell
a dairy overnight, it was proper for the jury to know
that oral contracts for the sale of land are not enforceable and the reason he was giving 'vas consistent with
the law.

10
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NO·T ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THA'T THE WRITTEN OFFER OF FEBRUARY 20TH
DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE LISTING AGR.EEMENT.

The trial court by Instruction 9 (c) (R. 75) told the
jury that as a matter of law the written offer of February 20, 1959, did not comply with the listing agreement, and that by securing this offer, Mr. Smith, the
appellant, had not earned his commission.
Appellant contends that this was a "red herring";
that no contention had been made that the written offer
of February 20th complied with the listing agreement.
Again, however, we point out to the court that the
appellant introduced this written offer into evidence
as Ex. 4. At the time the offer was made counsel for
respondent inquired why this document was being p·ut
in, and the court noted that counsel had already admitted that this offer was at variance with ~the listing
agreement. ·Counsel for appellant said he wanted to
get it in for "background", and the court commented
that this was part of the "path'' which would lead
the jury to the issue of whether the parties had agreed
on the terms of a sale, (R. 117).
There had also been evidence introduced to the
effect that shortly after the February 20th offer had
been submitted and before respondent had even talked
to the appellant about it, respondent overheard Mr.
Smith talking on the telephone in the lobby of the Newhouse Hotel. Respondent testified:
"I heard Mr. Smith say that he is 'stalling
for time, that it is a good deal and Holman is

11
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ready and willing to buy and I think that I am
entitled to my commission.' " (R. 195-7)
There also had been introduced in evidence as Ex.
7 a second copy of this offer of February 20th (R. 126)
and nowhere had the jury been told that it was not
sufficient in law for appellant to get an offer which
was close to the terms of the listing agreement
Since these documents had come in evidence as ''background", it was entirely prop·er for the court to tell the
jury that this written offer which had been introduced
in evidence twice and which 1\Ir. Smith thought was a
"good" deal, and had earned him a commission was not
effective to do that.
POINT IV.
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE COURT'S REFUSAL
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THA"T PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO A COMMISSION IF DEFENDANT CALLED
THE TRANSAGTIO·N OFF.

Without a general verdict having been submitted
to the jury, there isn't any way that appellant's Requested Instruction No. 1 would have made sense. It is
the type of instruction which could only have been given
had the matter been submitted to the jury for a general
verdict. It ends up by telling the jury that if it finds
certain things, "then you should return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for
the sum of $5,000.00." (R. 48). But the court gave the
jury no form (and app·ellant requested none) by which
it could have returned a general verdict of $5,000.00.
The only thing submitted to the jury 'vere the twro
propositions. The first proposition asked the jury to
determine whether or not the parties had reached agree-
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ment as to the terms of the sale, and the jury answered,
~'False", meaning that the parties had not reached agreement. In view of the fact that the matter was being
submitted on special interrogatories, it would have been
error to submit this instruction which called for a general verdict. No other request was submitted. No other
exception was taken, (R. 240). The total exception is
"Plaintiff excepts to the refusal of the court to give his
Requested Instructions Nos. 1 and 2.. " Instruction No. 1
called for a general verdict and could not have been
given in that form without a general verdict.
Further in answering the special interrogatory as
it did-that the parties had not reached an agreementthe jury has found against appellant on the basic premise
for this instruction, in any event.
POINT V.
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN SUBMITTING PROPOSITION NO. 2 TO THE JURY.

One of the issues reserved at the pre-trial involved
the question of whether a wife, who is a co-tenant, must
sign the listing agreement in order that there be an
enforceable agreement between the seller and the real
estate broker, (R. 12). The respondent had testified
that on the day the appellant got the listing he gave
the appellant a copy of a tax notice, (Ex. 10) which
shovved the wife to be a co-owner, (R. 193). The appellant was a real estate agent with 42 years of experience
and knew it would be necessary to have the wife co-sign
the deed, (R. 158). It is true that respondent testified
that he signed the listing and then at the conclusion of
this particular meeting just as appellant was leaving,

13
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the respondent got the tax notice for him, (R. 19'3).
We do not believe that the mere fact that the signing
of the listing preceded the delivery of the tax notice
would have the legal effect of making this a separate
transaetion. The appellant came to the Loertscher home
to get a listing. He as ·a p~art of this one visit got the listing and the tax notice. There is one Utah case, to-wit,
Stewart v. Lesm, 5 Utah 2d 383, 302 P. 2d 714 (1946)
and a line of cases from other jurisdictions, which
indicate that knowledge of the wife's ownership and that
she had not signed would void the agreement. See, for
example, Gray v. Blake (·Colo.), 283 P. 2d 1078, which
holds that where a broker knows that he does not have
a listing agreement from both owners, he can not recover
his commission. Here the jury was simply asked to
determine whether Mr. Smith knew that ~frs. Loertscher
was a co~owner.
We can not see how this could have in any way
prejudiced the appellant, even if the law were finally
resolved to be in harmony with the other line of cases
which hold that the wife's ownership makes no difference.
The question became moot when the jury answered the
first proposition "False". We do not believe that theTe
was any error in letting the jury ans,Yer this question,
but even if it were held that the proposition should not
have been submitted, we can not see how the app·ellant
possibly could have been prejudiced thereby.
POINT VI.
'THE UTAH CASES HOLD THAT EVEN IF AN INSTRUCTION IS EXTRANEOUS, THE VERDICT WILL NOT
BE REVERSED UNLESS IT IS PREJUDICIAL.

14
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We will not prolong this brief by discussing this
in detail. The problem is discussed in Moore v. Denver
& R~o Grande Western RR., (1956), 4 Ut. 2d 255, 292
P. 2d 849; Lemmon v. Denver & R~o Grande Western
RR., (1959), 9 Ut. 2d 195, 341 P. 2d 215; Bruner v.
McCarthy, (1943), 105 Ut. 399, 142 P. 2d 649·. The court
in these cases clearly lays down the rule that although
an instruction might have been better omitted, a case
will not be reversed unless there is a real showing of
prejudice to the complaining party.
POINT VII.
CROSS-ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. IF THIS COURT
WERE T·O HO·LD 'T'HAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ANY OF 'THE INS'TRUCTIONS GIVEN, THE
JUDGMENT SHOULD NEVERTHELESS BE AFFIRMED,
BECAUSE UNDER THE EVIDENCE THE COURT SHOULD
HAVE GRANTED DEFENDAN'T'S REQUEST FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT.

'The court should have directed a verdict, because
it is clear from the evidence that no written offer to
purchase on the listed terms or on other terms agreed
to by respondent was ever secured by the real estate
agent. It is also clear that respondent did not agree
in writing to any other terms than those listed.
It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Waters never
signed any written offer except the offer of February
20th. In fact, both the appellant (R. 150) and the respondent (R. 215) testified expressly that there was
never a contract drafted at any stage in these negotiations which was acceptable to either party. We believe
that the real estate commission could only be earne-d
under the listing agreement by either (a) presenting

15
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a written offer to purchase in accordance with the listed
terms, or by (b) presenting a written offer to purchase
on other terms agreeable to the respondent. See Lewis
v. Dahl (1945), 108 Utah 486, 161 P. 2d 362.
That case involved a suit by a real estate agent for
his commission. The agreement there provided that if
the property were sold by anybody during the term
of the listing contract the broker would get his commission. The evidence disclosed some arrangement between the seller and the ultimate buyer made prior to
the expiration of the listing agreement, but the deed of
conveyance was dated after the listing expired: The
question the court decided was : "When does a sale
take place~'' The court said :
''We are of the opinion, for reasons more
fully disclosed hereinafter, that the word 'sale'
in a real estate broker's listing contract~ which
renders the owner liable for payment of a commission in the event the owner himself makes a
sale during the term of the listing, means the
conveyance of title to ~the purchaser for a valuable
consideration consisting of the p·urchase price,
or the execution and delivery of a valid and
enforceable contract of sale \\"'"hereby some estate
in the land, legal or equitable, passes to the purchaser. Ad·mittedly, i.f the broker presents only
an oral offer to purchase, he is not entitled to
a commission ~tntil or unless that offer is put in
wr~t'ing and the owner has a duty to accept snch
offer under the terms o.f the listing, or unless olf'
until such t·ransactio11 is consunzn1ated; for no
on,e is bound by a mere oral offer. If the o:-wner
enters into an oral agreement to sell 'Yhich is not
consummated by payment of the purchase price
and delivery of the deed or by execution of a
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binding contract of sale, there is no assurarnce
that the owner will ever collect the purchase price.
Until the owner recetves ~a written offer or a
written acceptance which he can enforoe as a
valvd and binding contract, or until there is a
sale tvhich is recognvzed by the statute of fr.awds,
there ~s no sale within the meantng of the above
quoted provision in the broker's liJsting contract."
(emphasis added).
See also Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2·d 354, 267
P. 2d 237 ( 1954) . The court recognized that it had
heretofore held that the broker must procure a legally
enforceable written offer, which meets the terms of the
listing con trac;t or other terms to which the seller has
agreed. In that case the offer was oral, hut the buyer
had brought a suit for specific performance of the seller's
written offer, and the court held that this was tantamount
to a written offer, and that the purchasers "just as
effectively offered to buy the property" by bringing the
action for specific performance as "they could have
offered by signing a binding agreement." These two
cases should be conclusive on this point.
If a real estate agent could earn his commiSSion
simply by finding somebody who would orally say that
at a particular moment he was ready, willing and able
to buy the property on the listed terms, the seller could
really be hurt. If appellant's theory here is correct, his
commission would be earned at that point, because he
found somebody who would orally agree to buy the land
at the listed terms. Then two or three weeks later the
prospective purchaser could say, "I was ready, willing
and able on April 1st, but now when the time has come
for me to sign I have changed my mind and am no longer
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willing." The cases seem to be rather uniform in holding
that this is not enough.
It should also be noted that Section 25-5-4, U.C.A.
1953, requires the lisiting agreement itself to be in
writing before the agent can recover his commission.
It is also provided by the general statute of frauds
(Section 25-5-1) that a contract to convey an interest
in real estate must be written and signed. The listing
agreement in this case was prepared for the appellant.
If it is ambiguous, it must be construed against him.
If he had secured a written offer to buy at the listed price
and on the listed terms, he, of course, would have earned
his commission and would have been entitled to payment
even though the seller declined to sell. See, for example,
Little v. Fle~shman, 35 Ut. 566, 101 P. 984 and Ogden
Savings TrttSt Co. v. Blakely, 66 Ut. 229, 241 P. 221
(1925). But this did not happen here, and the appellant
must base his claim in this case on the contention that
he secured a buyer who had reached an "agreement"
with seller on other terms. We believe that as a matter
of law this ''agreement" to terms other than those listed
must be legally enforceable or the commission is not
earned.
The seller can not be held to have ''agreed" to some
terms other than those listed, if the seller's alleged
"agreement" is only oral. The rationale of this line
of cases is that to hold in the first instance that the real
estate agent's listing agreement n1ust be ,,. .ritten, and
then to hold that the agent can collect his commission
for procuring an offer to buy on some other terms (other
than those listed) on ~testimony that the seller had orallv
ol
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agreed to terms different from the written listing would
be nonsense. This is elaborately discussed in Roseberry
v. Heckler, (Arizona 1958), 326 P. 2d 365, and in August~'lne v. Trucco, 268 P. 2d 780, (Calif. 1954).
Two short quotes from these may suffice. In the
first case, the Arizona court said :
''We are constrained to hold that proof of
other acceptable terms can not he made by testimony of oral statements only that the owner
has agreed or will agree to such terms. Much
evil which was in1tended to be prevented by Section 44-101 supra, [which requires real estate
agent's agreements to be written] potentially
could result from permitting this class of oral
proof.... "
In the Augustine case the court said :
"No more backward step could be taken by
the courts than to countenance an action for a
broker's commission founded on an alleged statement of an owner, perhaps over the telephone,
that he would accept less for his p·roperty than
the price stipulated in the broker's written contract of employmen,t. The security which the
writing affords the parties would be taken from
the very heart of the agreement, and there would
be no protection against fraud and perjury."
We believe that this is a sound rule. I't was squarely
raised here by the motion for a non-suit (R. 92) and
by the request for a directed verdict (R. 56). It is adinitted by everyone that the only written offer secured
(Ex. 1) did not meet the terms of the listing agreement,
(R. 117). No other written offer which the respondent
seller could have accepted was ever secured, and respon-
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dent never was in a position where he could have accepted
and legally bound Mr. Waters to buy· on any other teTins.
In fact no agreement acceptable to the parties was ever
prepared, (R. 150). The cases cited above hold that this
is fatally defective to the plaintiff's case.
Further, we submit that the language of the listing agreement (Ex. 1) which obligates payment of the
commission if appellant finds a buyer willing to buy the
property at the listed price and on the listed terms
"or at any olJher price or terms to which I o·r we may
agree" means legally ''agree"; that the Arizona and
California cases cited above correctly state the law;
and that it is not competent merely to prove that the
seller orally agreed to terms other than those listed.
What possible sense could there be in our statute of
frauds requiring that the real estate listing agreement
be written, if after procuring a written listing setting
forth the specific teTins, the broker can then force the
payment of a commission by showing that the seller
orally agreed to teTins different from those listed~ If
such were the law, the sta~tute of fraud provision would
be useless.
Thus, on two grounds the plaintiff can not prevail
as a matter of law. First, he never procured a written
offer either (a) in accordance with the listing agreement,
or (b) in accordance with the alleged oral agreement
from the seller to accept other terms. Secondly, in the
face of a statute requiring a listing agreement to be
written, the agent ought not to be per1nitted to collect
a commission by proof that the seller orally agreed to
terms different from those listed in the "Titing.
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If we are right in this regard, then no instructions
should have been given. The verdict should have been
directed or the non-suit granted, and if there were any
prejudicial error in the instructions as given, this would
be immaterial.

CONCL·USION
It is respectfully submitted that this is a case where
there is direct and sharp conflict in the evidence on the
issue of possession. That issue was submitted to the
jury, and the jury found in favor of the defendant. The
clarifying instructions were all of assistance to the
jury, but even if appellant were correet that some were
extraneous, there could still have been no prejudice
therefrom. Finally, the plaintiff as a matter of law
must fail because he never procured a written offer
either in accordance with the alleged oral agreement,
nor wi~th the terms of the listing and in addition he
should not in the face of a statute requiring a listing
agreement to be written be permitted to show an oral
agreement to different terms. The judgmen~t should be
affirmed and respondent should be awarded his costs.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
Attorney for Respondent
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